SIXTY YEARS AGO: Pacific Theater of Operations: The Fall of Java

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Sixty Years Ago ...
Dateline - 1 March 1942
Pacific Theater of Operations
The Fall of Java
by Jennifer King and Timothy Rollins

March 1, 2002

Reflections on World War II

A Special Note to Our Readers: During the course of the war, there were good days for both sides and there were days both sides would have just as soon have forgotten. However, the days of February 28th and March 1st, 1942 were days that were by far the worst for the Allies in all of World War II.

In that time, Japanese planes had located the eight fleeing Allied ships that had survived their attack in the Java Sea, and in the mother of all firefights that ensued over those two days, ship after ship sunk, either killing the crew, or the survivors would find themselves shipped off to hellish Japanese internment camps, which in many cases were far worse than death itself. This would be BY FAR the worst naval defeat of the war in the Pacific. - Jennifer and Tim

Allied bad luck continued as the calendar pages continued to turn. After the disastrous fall of Singapore, the United States decided it needed to protect the now-fragile lines of communication open between Java and Australia. Accordingly, the USS Houston set sail for Timor on 15 February, 1942, with the 148th Field Artillery Regiment and a few thousand Australian troops. Beset by enemy bombers on the 15th and 16th, the small convoy turned back. The ships (save the Houston) were in port when Japanese Vice-Admiral Nobutake Kondo sailed boldly into the Timor Sea with a fleet comprised of two battleships, three heavy cruisers and Vice-Admiral Nagumo’s four carriers. This was the largest fleet assembled since the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Thomas C. Hart (1877-1971) On February 19th, 1942, the Japanese task force, aided by land-based bombers, attacked the Australian city of Darwin. They sunk eight Allied ships, destroyed the airport and rendered the port inoperable. Darwin was temporarily abandoned as a naval base. The Japanese then launched a successful invasion of Bali. This, in addition to their occupation of southern Sumatra, left Java as the only island still under the command of the combined forces of ABDAFLOAT. About two weeks prior to this, Admiral T.C. Hart (right) had given up his command to a Dutchman, Vice-Admiral C.E.L. Helfrich. The Dutch, having the majority interest in the region, argued long and hard for this change and the Americans, foreseeing the eventual success of the Japanese effort, had finally agreed.

The Japanese invasion of Java was to be the largest amphibious invasion of the war to date. The ABDA forces had been weakened by a series of actions which preceded the Java invasion, and much of the fleet was either damaged or sunk. Logistics were also becoming critical. Now that the great oil producing regions were in Japanese hands, fuel shortage was beginning to become a serious problem. Java was a great storage facility for fuel, but the oil stocks were kept far inland and the ABDA forces despaired of obtaining them.

On 18 February, Vice-Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa had led the main Western Attack Group out of Camranh Bay in Indochina. Ozawa’s forces consisted of three cruisers, six destroyers, a minesweeper, 56 transports and assorted cargo vessels. On the 19th, the Eastern Attack Force, under the command of Rear Admiral Shoji Nishimura, weighed anchor from Jolo in the Sulu Archipelago. Nishimura commanded a fleet consisting of 41 transports and six destroyers. These forces would be joined by others, ultimately consisting of an invasion force of 97 troopships.

Pre-invasion intelligence was spotty, at best. The Allied forces had been reduced to a handful of aging Buffalo Brewster fighters, a few patrol planes and a couple of submarines. Nevertheless, ABDA command determined that the Japanese were planning an invasion of Java in a three pronged approach.

Sensing the inevitable, British Field Marshall Sir Archibald Wavell recommended that British forces be evacuated. American General L.H. Brereton had likewise decided to withdraw the remaining Army Air Corps forces to India. On the 24th, he accompanied a few B-17s, and some transport planes loaded with air personnel to India. On the 25th, Field Marshall Wavell left for Colombo, effectively ending ABDA. The defense of Java now remained solely in Dutch hands, with the exception of a few American and British ships which had remained behind to help the Dutch.

The Dutch forces were now under the overall command of the Governor General of the Dutch East Indies. Vice-Admiral C.E.L Helfrich was made commander of the Navy, with Lieutenant General H. ter Poorten in charge of the Army and Major General Oyen the Air Forces. There were 7000 British and Australian troops left, with a component of 541 American soldiers.

Over the next few days, Rear-Admiral Karel W.F.M. Doorman utilized the dwindling fleet in order to try and track the Japanese invasion forces. There were a few scattered skirmishes, but Admiral Doorman was not successful until 27 February.

In the meantime, a last desperate attempt was made to buttress the defense forces. The USS Langley (left), an old collier built in 1912 and converted into an aircraft carrier in 1922, was nicknamed the “Covered Wagon” for her odd shape. Commanded by Commander R.P. McConnell, USN, Langley left Fremantle, Western Australia, with a complement of 32 US Army Air Force P-40 fighters and thirty-three pilots. Langley was accompanied by the freighter Sea Witch, which carried an additional 27 P-40’s in crates within her hold.

Admiral Helfrich, trying to get the planes as soon as possible, ordered a course change for Langley. This left the old ship vulnerable to air attack, and Japanese patrol planes and nine bombers from Kendari were soon swarming over the her. After taking five hits, Langley was on fire. A short time later inrushing water caused both main motors to fail and she went dead in the water. At 1332 hours, Commander McConnell decided to abandon ship. All but 16 of the crew and aviation personnel were rescued by the two accompanying destroyers. Langley was then scuttled with torpedo and shellfire.

Admiral Doorman was likewise having a tough time that same day. His fleet was comprised of his flagship, light cruiser De Ruyter ; heavy cruisers HMS Exeter and USS Houston; and the light cruisers HMAS Perth and HNMS Java. He also had some Dutch, five American and six British destroyers. Doorman’s force had no radar, and no air cover as the Netherlands Air Force commander based at Surabaya had decided to use his eight remaining Brewster Buffaloes in order to cover a futile dive-bomber attack on the Japanese transports. Doorman was also deprived of a potential ally in the ensuing fight. A British force, comprised of four cruisers and two destroyers, had been held in reserve in case of a Japanese strike from the South China Sea. Instead of joining Doorman, the fleet instead was ordered to retreat to Ceylon.

Admiral Doorman deployed his forces to meet the Japanese fleet. At 1616, the heavy cruisers Haguro and Nachi commenced firing upon their counterparts Exeter and Houston. Doorman soon found himself maneuvering in an attempt to keep the Japanese fleet from “crossing his T”, a tactical position which would give them the advantage of concentrating their fire on the head of his line.

The battle raged on without significant damage being exacted by either side until Exeter was hit by a shell from Haguro. The shell penetrated a magazine and exploded, causing Exeter to slow significantly and turn hard to port in order to avoid a collision with Houston. The cruisers following, lacking any information to the contrary, decided that Admiral Doorman must have ordered this move, and they all followed suit. The line was now in disarray, and provided a perfect target for Japanese torpedoes. A Dutch destroyer, Kortenaer was hit, and sank immediately.

The Allies were greatly hampered by the lack of communications and by the reduced visibility caused by burning ships and an intentionally set-down Japanese smoke screen. As the day faded into night, the British destroyer Electra, badly damaged by enemy fire, sank with her Captain, Commander May, still on board.

The fight continued sporadically through the night. The Japanese planes dropped illuminating star shells, keeping an eye on the Allied position. Admiral Doorman changed courses many times as he tried to find the invasion fleet. Skirting a Dutch-laid mine field he maneuvered himself around the shallow coast. Unfortunately, the last ship in the line, HMS Jupiter either hit a mine or was torpedoed. She sank, with only 78 of her crew reaching the island.

Admiral Doorman continued on his quixotic quest. At 2217, the fleet encountered some of the survivors of the Kortenaer bobbing about in life rafts. Doorman ordered Encounter to drop out and help them, thereby leaving the cruisers without destroyer cover. At 2300 the fleet re-encountered cruisers Nachi and Haguro and the battle resumed. Little damage was incurred until the Japanese cruisers launched torpedoes at 2330. Again, luck was with the Japanese, as the torpedoes found their mark, striking and ultimately sinking De Ruyter and Java. Brave Admiral Doorman went down with his flagship.

The Japanese forces had not lost a single ship, suffering significant damage to only one destroyer. The invasion forces, it was estimated, were detained at most by two days.

In the ensuing attempt to unite the two wings of the now-divided fleet, Admiral Helfrich ordered the remaining ships to proceed down the Sunda Strait and regroup at Tjilatjap. The Admiral was unaware that the Strait was already in Japanese possession.

In the ensuing Battle of the Sunda Strait, the scant remainders of the Allied fleet were all lost. HMS Perth went down first, leaving the gallant men aboard the USS Houston to fight it out alone until their very last drop of ammunition was expended. Decks strewn with dead and dying, her Captain killed, abandon ship was finally sounded at 0033. Houston had a crew of over 1000, only 368 men would survive and join the survivors of Perth and the other ships in hellish internment camps run by the Japanese.

The four old American destroyers Ford, Paul Jones, Edwards and Alden; joined by destroyers Parrott and Whipple; the cruiser Marblehead and two gunboats were the only surface fighting ships of the Asiatic Fleet to survive the actions around Java. ***

Photos of Jennifer King and Timothy Rollins courtesy of staff files
Photo of Admiral Thomas C. Hart courtesy of Arlington National Cemetery
Photo of USS Langley (CV-1) courtesy of United States Navy