Sixty Years Ago ...
Dateline:
7 May 1942
The
Battle of the Coral Sea
Pacific
Theater of Operations
by
Jennifer King and Timothy Rollins
First of Two Parts
Reflections on World War II
A
Special Note to Our Readers: As we head into the Battle of the Coral Sea,
we will be looking at how both sides - the Allies and the Japanese, were preparing
as best they could and doing all they could to best read and anticipate their
opponent's next moves. With the Allies running scared and the Japanese in a
very confident position - "Victory Disease" if you will - which they
had every right to be in, given their overwhelming successes so far at this
stage in the war, the Allies knew something had to break their way and soon
if they were going to stand any chance whatsoever of ever recapturing the Pacific.
This is the first of two parts detailing the Battle of the Coral
Sea. Part Two will run on Wednesday. - Jennifer and Tim
On
9 March 1942, after Java fell to the Japanese, President Roosevelt cabled the
following message to Winston Churchill (right): “The Pacific situation is now
very grave.” This “understatement of the year” reflected a reality which steadily
worsened through the next few months. The Japanese “octopus” had reached its
tentacles down to the very door of Australia, and totally encompassed almost
the whole of the South-Western Pacific.
In almost every instance, save the Philippines, the Japanese troops initially were greeted like liberators in the former European colonial provinces. Meanwhile, Allied forces in the Pacific were spread thin, military assets were scarce and the Allies had been defeated in every action to date.
The Japanese, even the normally conservative Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, were flush with “victory disease”. The goals laid out in the War Plan of 1938, and the seemingly soon-to-be accomplishment of “Hakko Ichiu” (the eight corners of the world under one roof) had been achieved in half the estimated time. Japanese losses up to 1 May, 1942 amounted to only 23 naval vessels, 67 transports and merchant ships, a few hundred planes and a few thousand soldiers and sailors. No ships larger than a destroyer had been sunk.
The
Allies, on the other hand, were on the retreat in every theater of the War.
Germany was making headway in North Africa, and there was great fear that Rommel
(1891-1944, left) might seize the Suez Canal. The German Wolfpack preyed freely
upon ships in the Atlantic. During the first three months of 1942, the Allies
lost over two million tons of merchant shipping; during the next three months
they would lose two million and a quarter tons more. The Japanese were wreaking
havoc in the Pacific, and General MacArthur and Admiral King (right) complained
bitterly to Washington about their lack of resources.
Roosevelt and Churchill, in an agreement signed on 17 March 1942, had given the responsibility for the defense of the entire Pacific to the United States and responsibility for the defense of the Indian Ocean and the Middle East to the Brits. The Pacific command was further divided on 30 March, with MacArthur being named Commander-in-Chief of the newly created Southwest Pacific Area (CINCSWPA); and Admiral Nimitz being named Commander in Chief of the Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA), which roughly fell north of latitude 20 degrees north, and east of longitude 160 degrees east.
Nimitz’s command would be further divided with the creation of the South Pacific Area, South Pole, which would be commanded by Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, from his CP in Noumea, New Caledonia.
General
Douglas MacArthur (left), ensconced in his HQ in Australia, soon began to discover
bitter disagreement among Australian politicos and military policy advisors.
Many, not wishing to repeat mistakes made earlier in the war, did not feel that
Port Moresby, in New Guinea, could be held and did not wish to expend personnel
and material in what might be a failed effort. MacArthur vigorously disagreed,
arguing that Port Moresby was vital to the defense of Australia, and instrumental
in keeping open the indispensable shipping lanes.
The Japanese, meanwhile, were having some disagreements among themselves. The Army wanted to consolidate gains, and strengthen positions already held; while the Navy wanted to extend the defensive perimeter. Admiral Yamamoto, especially, wanted to neutralize the American carriers that had been missed during the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Jimmy Doolittle’s raid spooked the high command and solidified Yamamoto’s hand. Further offensive actions were planned - the conquest of Tulagi and Port Moresby in order to secure the Coral Sea and provide a base for bombing northern and eastern Australia; the capture of Midway and the western Aleutians as bait to lure out the American fleet; and the occupation of New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa, cutting communications between the United States and Australasia.
The first phase of the plan, named Operation MO, was the seizure of Tulagi and Port Moresby. As with many Japanese naval operations, the plan was somewhat more complex than necessary. The forces consisted of: the Port Moresby Invasion Group under the command of Rear Admiral Sadamichi Kajioka; the smaller Tulagi Invasion Group under the command of Rear Admiral Kiyohide Shima; a Support Group under the command of Rear Admiral Kuninori Marumo; a Covering Group commanded by Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto; and a Striking Force which consisted of two carriers with a destroyer and cruiser attachment commanded by Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi. Overall command of the mission was given to Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inouye, Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet.
Allied plans, both in the Battle of the Coral Sea and particularly in the spectacular victory at Midway, owed their success to one man - Colonel William Freidman, a brilliant logician who had finally broken the Japanese code, nicknamed “Magic”.
The ability to decode “Magic” transmissions, plus air reconnaissance and some intelligence on the ground from spies based in New Britain, showed the Allies that the Japanese forces were amassing. Admiral Nimitz guessed that they would move around the first week in May, and he also correctly surmised that their target was Port Moresby.
Nimitz assigned two Task Forces to counter the Japanese assault. Task Force 17, under the command of Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher; and Task Force 11, commanded by Rear Admiral Aubrey W. Fitch. Admirals Fletcher and Fitch had been classmates at the Naval Academy. According to esteemed historian Samuel Eliot Morison, Fletcher had graduated “well up in the first half”, but Fitch “very near the anchor.”
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Admiral
Fitch, however, was considered the most experienced carrier admiral in the Navy.
Fitch had been flying since 1930, and he had commanded patrol wings, naval air
stations and three “flat-tops”. He was now the flag officer in command of carrier
Lexington, with Captain Frederick C. (Ted) Sherman as C.O. Lexington
(left), or Lady Lex, as her crew called her, had seen combat duty already
in the Pacific war. She was home to several famed aviators, including John C.
Thach and “Butch” O’Hare (right).
Carrier Yorktown was commanded by Admiral Fletcher, who was put in charge of the entire operation. Fletcher’s nebulous orders were to, “Operate in the Coral Sea commencing 1 May 1942.”
The two Task Forces were joined by veteran commander Rear Admiral J.C. Crace, RN and his Task Force 44, comprised of two Australian and one American cruisers, and later joined by two destroyers. Crace was ordered to join Fletcher in the Coral Sea on 4 May.
In the meantime, Admiral Inouye was fully expecting that the Allied forces would engage him. He hoped to catch them unawares in a pincer movement in between Admirals Goto and Takagi, sink as many ships as possible and then proceed through the Jomard Pass into Port Moresby. ***
© 2002 Jennifer King and Timothy Rollins
Stay tuned for Part Two coming later this week ...
COPYRIGHT © 2002 BY THE AMERICAN PARTISAN. All writers retain rights to their work.
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