Sixty Years Ago ...
Dateline:
August 1942
Guadalcanal
Pacific
Theater of Operations
by
Jennifer King and Timothy Rollins
September 5, 2002
Reflections on World War II
A
Special Note to Our Readers: This is the first article
in a while on the World War II Series. The reason for this being is that during
the corresponding period in 1942 during the war, there were no pivotal events
of the war that occurred. What we will be doing here is an introduction to the
events at Guadalcanal, after which we will be doing follow-up on the Marines
throughout the campaign. Our next article will take a look at what was going
on in Europe at this point in the war as well. - Jennifer
and Tim
The first Allied offensive in the Pacific was “Operation Watchtower”, the capture of Guadalcanal, in the Solomon Islands. Guadalcanal was a notable operation from many standpoints - it involved numerous battles and six major naval engagements, and it took a bruising six months to achieve victory.
The
Solomons campaign had been designed much earlier, by Admiral Ernest J. King
(right), in February of 1942, when it became apparent that the Allies would
have to oust the Japanese from the islands inch by bloody inch. The Japanese
menace now lurked dangerously close to the coasts of Australia and New Zealand,
threatening both nations and the slender lifeline linking them to American resources
and material. They would have to be removed.
On 4 July, an Allied reconnaissance plane spotted an alarming development on the island of Guadalcanal - the Japanese were building an airstrip on the later named Henderson Field. This provided an immediate threat, as a seaplane base on Guadalcanal could easily be used to knock out Allied bases on Espirito Santo and Efate. Vice-Admiral Robert L. Ghormly, appointed Commander South Pacific Force, was in charge of the operation. Tactical command was given to Vice-Admiral Frank Fletcher, as head of the newly formed Task Force 61. The South Pacific Amphibious Force was headed by Rear Admiral Richard Kelly Turner, and the First Marine Division was commanded by Major General Alexander Archer Vandergrift. Air command was supported by Rear Admiral J.R. McCain’s South Pacific Air Forces and MacArthur’s 19th Bombing Group, lumped together in Task Force 63. On 7 August 1942, 11,000 Marines charged ashore at Guadalcanal and neighboring Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo. The surprised Japanese, mostly laborers, surrendered quickly on Guadalcanal, but the Marines met with fierce resistance on the other islands. When the smoke finally cleared at 2100 on 8 August, 122 Americans and 863 Japanese were dead, and the Americans were in full control of the coveted airfield. Things seemed well in hand, and no one could have predicted that it would take twenty-six weeks of hard fighting to keep it that way.
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Japanese
Admiral Gunichi Mikawa (left) responded to the loss of Guadalcanal by sending
immediate air strikes from the base at Rabaul. Mikawa also ordered six transports
of reinforcements to the Solomons, but recalled them after one ship was sunk.
Admiral Mikawa then decided to personally take command of his fleet, and stage
a massive attack upon the enemy while he was still offloading cargo and personnel
at Guadalcanal. The ensuing “Battle of Savo Island” was destined to become one
of the worst defeats ever inflicted upon the United States Navy.
The Japanese forces had two advantages over the American ones. Due to differences in training and outlook, Japanese troops were well-versed in night fighting while the Americans were not. Also, the Imperial Navy possessed an eminently better torpedo, the “Long Lance”. The Lance had a range of between 22,000 and 40,000 yards, while the American torpedo - the Mark XV - had a range of only 6,000 yards. The Lance had the additional bonus of actually exploding upon contact with the designated target.
Deciding upon the preferred night attack, Admiral Mikawa steamed boldly down the double line of islands later nicknamed “The Slot” by the Marines. Admiral Turner, meanwhile, was arguing forcefully with Admiral Fletcher, after Fletcher decided to withdraw his carrier force before they could be sunk by the enemy’s vastly superior torpedoes. By 1807, Fletcher was off the island of San Cristobal, 120 miles from Savo. Admiral Turner, in his own colorful way, described himself as being left “bare-arse”.
Turner was further hampered by poor intelligence, despite earlier reports on the Japanese forces by the land-based Coastwatchers and two reconnaissance planes. The search area had been split between the forces, leaving potential gaps - gaps big enough for Admiral Mikawa to sneak through, as it turned out. Poor weather also impacted visibility, and Mikawa used the cloud cover to obscure his movements. Admiral Turner, and the American forces, were taken completely unawares.
The Japanese fleet wreaked havoc with the American ships. When it was all over, four cruisers were sunk, along with 1077 Allied servicemen. Additionally, two destroyers were badly damaged, and 709 additional men were wounded. Admiral Mikawa escaped unscathed, although the heavy cruiser Kako was sunk by submarine S44 on her return to Rabaul. Despite his victory, Admiral Mikawa was reprimanded by Admiral Yamamoto for failing to sink Admiral Turner’s transports - the primary goal behind the mission.
Admiral Turner hastily withdrew with the valuable transports, and the Marines were now alone - on “that stinking, fetid island.” ***
© 2002 Jennifer King and Timothy Rollins
COPYRIGHT © 2002 BY THE AMERICAN PARTISAN. All writers retain rights to their work.
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