The China Puzzle, Part
3
by Linda A. Prussen-Razzano
As you may have already guessed, the military's presence in Chinese commercial ventures is, quite bluntly, pervasive.
Although China was able to manufacturer their own indigenous nuclear weapons, much of their technology was based on antiquated developments gleaned from the Soviet Union. By the early 1980s, China had turned to the West as a source for upgrading their military.
In July of 1982, several offices within the Chinese government, including the Central Military Commission's (CMC) Office of Science, Technology, and Equipment, the National Defense Industry, and the National Defense Science and Technology Commission, all merged to form the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). COSTIND answers to and works in cooperation with China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA).
COSTIND has worked aggressively to further China\rquote s national security interests and attack capabilities, controlling a vast network of personnel and resources. "While there is a range of different estimates, this study speculates that China's defense-industrial complex may include as many as 50,000 factories, research academies, and other facilities, with possibly five million personnel. Whole towns, some secret, are part of this immense complex." (96-889 "China: Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) and Defense Industries," Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Shirley A. Kan, December 3, 1997). In 1997, the records indicate that the Chinese manpower dedicated to military enhancement was approximately 4 times the size of America's current standing army.
COSTIND's primary function is the acquisition of modern technology, preferably "dual-use" technology that can be transitioned for military applications. In the early 1990's, COSTIND's focus specifically shifted; "COSTIND Deputy Director Shen Rongjun called for China's weapon development programs to focus on high-technology, especially electronics and military applications of satellites." (96-889, Kan, December 3, 1997).
News and intelligence reports indicate that in order for COSTIND to obtain this technology, they created various "civilian" fronts (some of which are directly under the supervision of the PLA), including:
Several of these companies have engaged in dual-use purchases with the United States and Europe. COSTIND's purchasing pattern is such that it buys only specific items from a wide variety of sources, thereby preventing it from becoming too dependent upon any one supplier. Further, under the Arms Export Control Act, Congress will only be notified of foreign military sales (FMS) or direct commercial sales (DCS) if the price tag reaches $14 million; hence, China could purchase various necessary technologies without an alarm being raised in Congress.
Another "known" avenue of information acquisition is the China Defense Science and Technology Information Center (CDSTIC), which operates under the innocuous name of The Intelligence Research Institute. The Institute promotes the sharing of sensitive technology information with academia and through professional organizations. This precursor to COSTIND, formed in 1959, is the intelligence hub of the CMC. It now answers to COSTIND.
While some folks still consider them "friends," various sources indicate that what COSTIND did not legally acquire from the United States, it attempted to steal...in more ways than one. ***
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