The China Puzzle, Part
4
by Linda A. Prussen-Razzano
Why are satellites important? They have a "dual-use."
First, there are the non-military applications and benefits. They can carry voice transmissions for cellular phones, data transmissions for pagers, etc., and video transmissions for broadcasting. They can assist in tracking and forecasting the weather.
Second, there are the military applications and benefits. They can allow for tracking troops movements, performing remote launches, and relaying intelligence data.
It's no surprise that every emerging world power wants some of their own. It's also no surprise that China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC), China's premiere developer of satellites, is owned by the China Aerospace Corporation (CASC). Finally, it's no surprise that designated launch sites, such as the Xichang Satellite Launch Center, are also known bases for the PLA, China's People's Liberation Army.
As we already know, the Chinese Military has its fingers in lots of pots.
The technology used to launch these satellites is far more precious than the satellites, themselves; it is not dissimilar to the method used to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Because China at one time did not have this capability, it relied on outside countries, such as the United States, for assistance. Sometimes it supplied the satellite, sometimes we supplied the satellite, and we also supplied the launch missiles.
One would think our government, understanding all of this, might take steps to strengthen the transfer of such sensitive technology to a Communist county.
Well, they used to...
China launched its first satellite in April of 1970. By the beginning of 1998, China had launched 80 various satellites, including 12 "experimental" ones (which may have directly contributed to its military might).
Between 1990 and 1993, 19 "dual-use" technology license applications from China for satellites were approved by the Commerce Department, for a total of 67 transfers. Dual-use transfers fell under COCOM guidelines and were subject to approval by the State Department, who could defer to the Department of Defense, if necessary. The Department of Defense, under it's Technology Safeguards Monitoring Program, oversaw the launches of U.S. built satellites in China and could demand special documents, technical information exchange assurances, and agreements to confirm non-military end-use.
In October of 1992, President Bush transferred dual-use licenses to the Department of Commerce, which presumably was under the same strict guidelines as the State Department. Ironically, when the U.S. imposed sanctions against China in April of 1993 (specifically, against our friends at CGWIC), the State Department denied China’s requests for satellites, but the Commerce Department approved them (even though components of the dual-use satellites were considered “military”). In September of 1993, The Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee, chaired by Ron Brown, the head of the Commerce Department, recommended shifting commercial satellites completely into Commerce’s hands.
In April of 1994, just days after the COCOM guidelines expired, the Commerce Department created GLX, a new licensing category. Under GLX, almost all of the safeguards established by the Department of Defense did not exist. Under GLX, the manufacturer, not the U.S. Government, was responsible for determining non-military end-use.
In April of 1995, a meeting occurred between the State Department and the Chairman of the President's Export Council. The meeting centered on “liberating” restrictions for communication satellites and turning full control of their transfers over to the Commerce Department. In response, the State Department formed the Comsat Technical Working Group (comprised of individuals from the State Department, the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Agency, and the CIA) to review the matter. By October of 1995, the verdict was in: they said no; however, they would consider easing Defense’s involvement to facilitate international trade.
Apparently, this was insufficient for the President who, through Executive Order in March of 1996, transferred licensing jurisdiction for all communication satellites and commercial jet engine hot section technologies satellites directly to the Commerce Department. Further, under the same Executive Order, the Department of Defense had to alert and gain the support of multiple departments if it hoped to stop a transfer, instead of preventing the transfer on its authority alone.
Ultimately, due to the failure of a satellite shortly after talk-off, the concerns expressed by the Comsat team were realized. “A classified report at the Department of Defense's Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) reportedly concluded in May 1997 that Loral and Hughes transferred expertise to China that significantly enhanced the reliability of its nuclear ballistic missiles and ‘United States national security has been harmed.’” (Report #98-485 F, “China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers,” Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Shirley A. Kan, June 12, 1998).
Despite all this and more, on May 10, 1999, the President granted a special waiver for China to purchase “satellite fuels and separation systems for the U.S.-origin Iridium commercial communications satellite program” because “the material and equipment, including any indirect technical benefit that could be derived from such export, will not measurably improve the missile or space launch capabilities of the People's Republic of China.”
Who is he kidding? ***
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