The China
Puzzle, Part 5
by Linda A. Prussen-Razzano
In a dangerous world, speed can make all the difference…fast computers, fast communications, and fast fighter planes give us the leading military edge. Sometimes speed is our only edge over the enemy, allowing us to intercept or outrun our foes.
When it comes to technology and national defense, there are several areas of critical, non-weapon specific importance, including: the communication of voice transmissions, the communication of data, and the processing of sensitive information.
Enter ATM, SDH, and supercomputers, just three more “items” that fell under the auspicious GLX category created by the Commerce Department in 1994.
ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Method) and SDH (Synchronous Digital Hierarchy) equipment is commonly used in broadband networks, which allow for the transmission of data, video, and audio at very high rates of speed. Upscale American CEOs might find this configuration a nifty communication tool for their various national branches (video conferencing, anyone?). Likewise, the Chinese Military might find this configuration a nifty communication tool…between their front line and command control, between the injured in the field and the hospitals back home, between their various covert ops and their leaders.
Enter our friends at COSTIND. COSTIND surreptitiously controlled a company called Galaxy New Technology. In 1993, Galaxy New Technology merged with SCM Brooks Telecommunications, forming Guangzhou HauMei Communications Limited. In 1993, HuaMei contracted AT&T to provide them with a broadband telecommunications network. Unless one knew the history of HuaMei, one might not know that the Chinese Military had indirectly engaged in a business deal with AT&T to secure some very desirable, advanced communications technology.
Under earlier COCOM guidelines, this type of transfer license would face two potential obstacles; the “end-user’s” ties to the military, and assurances that the technology did not exceed certain levels of capability. In 1994, when the installation took place, GLX was already in existence. Under GLX, AT&T did not need a special license. Under GLX, China could purchase this technology, regardless of capability. Further, during a subsequent investigation into this matter, AT&T advised that the Commerce Department never asked them to determine if HuaMei was somehow connected to the military; the GLX license didn’t require it. Had these controls been in place, AT&T undoubtedly would have followed them accordingly…but they weren’t.
Simply put, in 1994 we legally sold China the technology they needed to significantly enhance their military communications operations.
As for our supercomputers, well…
Unlike regular desktops and workstations, these mega-computing monsters are generally categorized by their speed, or MTOPS (Million Theoretical Operations Per Second). They can crunch massive, complex problems in milliseconds, can calculate multiple variants and their effects, can project something as unpredictable as the impact of a specific size nuclear weapon. They are typically used by our military for just this purpose.
Congressional records indicate that during the Bush Administration, a computer with a speed of 195 MTOPS was considered a “supercomputer.” Despite vehement protests from allies world-wide, the Clinton Administration raised the level to 2,000 MTOPS, and then to 7,000 MTOPS.
As a reference only, Silicon Graphics, a manufacturer of supercomputers, currently has three systems with speeds exceeding one trillion calculations per second (TTOPS), while, between 1997 to the present, the typical household computer averages 100 MTOPS to 350 MTOPS. This isn’t something one would by at their local computer retailer; these types of systems can easily cost several hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Again, under those loose GLX guidelines, one of our supercomputers unwittingly ended up in the Russian Scientific Research Institute for Technical Physics. Another one ended up at China's National University of Defense Technology in Changsha. These systems may have been sold to approved countries, who later resold them to China and Russia; nevertheless, the Commerce Department has subsequently allowed the direct sale of an estimated 190+ supercomputers to China, but has only been able to confirm non-military compliance for one.
Gee, would you look at that? Did we sell China another bit of the necessary technology to dramatically increase their military capability?
Yes, we did.
As an interesting side note, the Chief Legal Counsel for the Commerce Department Bureau of Export Affairs (BXA), Mr. Hoyt Zia, continued to approve licenses even after experiencing difficulty in confirming end-use. According to news reports, Mr. Zia made jaunts to China and also worked part-time at the DNC (Democratic National Committee) on the Clinton/Gore 1996 campaign. He was also friendly with another more notorious Commerce Department worker-turned-DNC fundraiser, Johnny Huang. Yes, that’s the same Johnny Huang who funneled several million dollars in illegal campaign contributions into the DNC, some directly from the Chinese military.
Suspect? You bet it is. ***
Related Sources:
H1275, “China Will Stop At Nothing,” House of Representatives, Mr. Traficant, March 16, 1999.
S2622-S2624, “UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,” Senate, Mr. Thomas, March 15, 1999.
E315, Extension of Remarks, “East Asia and Missile Defense Systems,” from The Economist, February 20, 1999, introduced into the House of Representatives by the Hon. Doug Bereuter, March 2, 1999.
Silicon Graphics, Inc, “Silicon Graphics Leads List of World's Most Powerful Supercomputers, Industry Leader's Systems Capture 46 of Top 100 Spots; Three Systems' Peak Rates Exceed a Trillion Calculations Per Second,” Mountain View, CA, November 5, 1998.
H.AMDT.708 AMENDS: H.R.4103, “An amendment to prohibit any funding to be used to enter into or renew a contract with any company owned, or partially owned, by the People's Republic of China or the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China,” House of Representatives, Rep. Sanders, June 24, 1998.
1997 Congressional Hearings, Special Weapons, Nuclear, Chemical, Biological and Missile, TEXT OF REMARKS OF DR. STEPHEN D. BRYEN PREPARED FOR DELIVERY ON THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1997 TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
S7140, “NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998,” Senate, July 10, 1997.
E1355, Extension of Remarks, “China-Related Challenges,” by Dr. Stephen Bryen and Michael Ledeen, House of Representatives, June 27, 1997.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998, SEC. 1234. POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION OF EXPORT OF SUPERCOMPUTERS, House of Representatives, June 19, 1997.
EX. ORD. NO. 12981. ADMINISTRATION OF EXPORT CONTROLS, Ex. Ord. No. 12981, Dec. 5, 1995, 60 F.R. 62981, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 13020, Oct. 12, 1996, 61 F.R. 54079; Ex. Ord. No.13026, Sec. 1(b), Nov. 15, 1996, 61 F.R. 58767, William Jefferson Clinton.
GAO/NSIAD-97-5, “Export Controls: Sale of Telecommunications Equipment to China,” Letter Report, November 13, 1996.
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